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	<title>Alonso Robles &#187; security</title>
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	<link>http://alonsorobles.com</link>
	<description>technology, academia, and other tidbits from the trenches of a boggled mind</description>
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		<title>Guerrilla Threat Modelling (or &#8216;Threat Modeling&#8217;)</title>
		<link>http://alonsorobles.com/2010/08/23/guerrilla-threat-modelling-or-threat-modeling/</link>
		<comments>http://alonsorobles.com/2010/08/23/guerrilla-threat-modelling-or-threat-modeling/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Aug 2010 20:16:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alonso Robles</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[.NET Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Software Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[threat modeling]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alonsorobles.com/?p=193</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[An interesting read on Guerrilla Threat Modelling (or &#8216;Threat Modeling&#8217; if you&#8217;re American) by Peter Torr. This is a relatively old post, but still applies today. In addition, a good practice to implementing threat countermeasures is the STRIDE approach which is described &#8230; <a href="http://alonsorobles.com/2010/08/23/guerrilla-threat-modelling-or-threat-modeling/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An interesting read on <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ptorr/archive/2005/02/22/guerillathreatmodelling.aspx">Guerrilla Threat Modelling (or &#8216;Threat Modeling&#8217; if you&#8217;re American)</a> by Peter Torr. This is a relatively old post, but still applies today. In addition, a good practice to implementing threat countermeasures is the <a title="Uncover Security Design Flaws Using The STRIDE Approach" href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc163519.aspx">STRIDE approach which is described in MSDN magazine</a>.</p>
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		<title>Daniel Larson&#8217;s Best Practices for Elevated Privilege in SharePoint</title>
		<link>http://alonsorobles.com/2008/06/06/daniel-larsons-best-practices-for-elevated-privilege-in-sharepoint/</link>
		<comments>http://alonsorobles.com/2008/06/06/daniel-larsons-best-practices-for-elevated-privilege-in-sharepoint/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2008 21:57:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alonso Robles</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Sharepoint Server]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Windows Sharepoint Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[best practices]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[moss 2007]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wss 3.0]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.importchaos.com/alonsorobles/?p=56</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[via Daniel Larson] Daniel Larson, a MOSS MVP, has been ranting over the past few days about the use of the SPSecurity.RunWithElevatedPrivileges method. While I have been amused with his rants, I share his concerns and frustrations as a result of &#8230; <a href="http://alonsorobles.com/2008/06/06/daniel-larsons-best-practices-for-elevated-privilege-in-sharepoint/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[via <a href="http://daniellarson.spaces.live.com/Blog/cns!D3543C5837291E93!2005.entry">Daniel Larson</a>]</p>
<p><a href="http://daniellarson.spaces.live.com/Blog/">Daniel Larson</a>, a MOSS MVP, has been ranting over the past few days about the use of the <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/microsoft.sharepoint.spsecurity.runwithelevatedprivileges.aspx">SPSecurity.RunWithElevatedPrivileges</a> method. While I have been amused with his rants, I share his concerns and frustrations as a result of using the method in my SharePoint development experience and seeing the method abused and missused in many code reviews. Today, he posted <a href="http://daniellarson.spaces.live.com/Blog/cns!D3543C5837291E93!2005.entry">a list of his best practices for gaining &#8220;elevated privileges&#8221; SharePoint</a>.</p>
<p>Daniel Larson&#8217;s list of best practives for elevated privileges in SharePoint:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>Avoid using SPSecurity.RunwithElevatedPrivilege to access the SharePoint object model. Instead, use the SPUserToken to impersonate with SPSite.</li>
<li>If you do use SPSecurity.RunwithElevatedPrivilege, dispose of all objects in the delegate. Do not pass SharePoint objects out of the <em>RunwithElevatedPrivilege</em>  method.</li>
<li>Only use SPSecurity.RunwithElevatedPrivilege to make network calls under the application pool identity. Don&#8217;t use it for elevation of privilege of SharePoint objects.</li>
<li>Always use the SPSite constructor with an SPUserToken to create an elevated privilege security context in SharePoint. To impersonate the system, use the SystemAccount.UserToken property of the current SPSite context, such as:<br />
var site = new SPSite(SPContext.Current.Site.ID,  SPContext.Current.Site.SystemAccount.UserToken);</li>
<li>Avoid passing SharePoint objects between different security contexts (<em>SPSite</em> instances), with the exception of the SPUserToken used in the SPSite ctor. An SPUser object created from <em>SPSite A </em>cannot (reliably) be passed to <em>SPSite B</em>. This can be the source of obscure bugs in production that are difficult to reproduce in development. For example, an <em>SPUser</em> reference created from SPContext.Current.Site cannot reliably be used in an elevated site context, as the user reference <em>may</em> take on a different meaning in the alternate context.</li>
<li>Never use elevated privilege to bypass security&#8211; always use it to work <em>with</em> security.</li>
<li>Restrict what assemblies can use elevated privilege by running in minimal trust, avoiding the GAC, and auditing any CAS policies deployed with vendor solutions.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
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